Undefeated equilibria of the Shi–Trejos–Wright model under adverse selection
Ayushi Bajaj
Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 176, issue C, 957-986
Abstract:
Decentralized markets where assets are useful as media of exchange are also usually subject to private information. To analyze the liquidity and prices of such assets, I adapt the Shi (1995), Trejos and Wright (1995) model with Lucas trees under adverse selection. While most studies focus on either a pooling or separating equilibrium, I apply the undefeated equilibrium refinement by Mailath et al. (1993) to make the selection based on fundamentals. Under pooling, the high-quality asset holder accepts a pooled price, and under separating signals quality through asset retention. Applying the refinement results in a regime switch from no-information (pooling) to information revelation (separating) following a negative shock to the quality or quantity of lemons. This change leads to a discontinuous fall in aggregate welfare.
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Signaling; Search; Asset market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 E44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:957-986
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.014
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