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Strategic gradual learning and information transmission

Alexander Frug

Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 177, issue C, 594-615

Abstract: Prior to advising a decision maker, the expert needs to gather some relevant information. This often takes time, and therefore, even if the expert's learning process is unobservable, the timing of advice can be informative in itself. If, in addition, the expert can choose which experiments to perform, the timing of her advice may reveal not only the amount but also the type of information at her disposal. This paper studies a dynamic information transmission problem where a biased expert acquires information by performing a sequence of experiments, which cannot be observed by the decision maker. It is shown that, even in the absence of an objective reason to expedite information transmission, artificial time pressure can increase the amount of information transmitted and be beneficial to both players.

Keywords: Gradual learning; Strategic scheduling of experiments; Dynamic information transmission; Cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Gradual Learning and Information Transmission (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Strategic gradual learning and information transmission (2016) Downloads
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