EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences

Yves Sprumont ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 178, issue C, 222-245

Abstract: The belief-weighted Nash social welfare functions are methods for aggregating Savage preferences defined over a set of acts. Each such method works as follows. Fix a 0-normalized subjective expected utility representation of every possible preference and assign a vector of individual weights to each profile of beliefs. To compute the social preference at a given preference profile, rank the acts according to the weighted product of the individual 0-normalized subjective expected utilities they yield, where the weights are those associated with the belief profile generated by the preference profile. We show that these social welfare functions are characterized by the weak Pareto principle, a continuity axiom, and the following informational robustness property: the social ranking of two acts is unaffected by the addition of any outcome that every individual deems at least as good as the one she originally found worst. This makes the belief-weighted Nash social welfare functions appealing in contexts where the best relevant outcome for an individual is difficult to identify.

Keywords: Preference aggregation; Uncertainty; Subjective expected utility; Nash product (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053118306094
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Belief-weighted Nash Aggregation of Savage Preferences (2018) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:178:y:2018:i:c:p:222-245

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

 
Page updated 2019-11-16
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:178:y:2018:i:c:p:222-245