Ambiguous persuasion

Dorian Beauchêne, Jian Li and Ming Li

Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 179, issue C, 312-365

Abstract: We study a persuasion game à la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) where players are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). With no prior ambiguity, a Sender may choose to use ambiguous communication devices. Our main result characterizes the value of optimal ambiguous persuasion, which is often higher than what is feasible under Bayesian persuasion. We characterize posteriors that are potentially plausible when they are generated by ambiguous devices. One way to construct an optimal ambiguous communication device is by using synonyms, messages that lead to the same posteriors, in which Sender can hedge himself against ambiguity while inducing actions from Receiver that would not be possible under standard Bayesian persuasion. We also show that the use of synonyms are a necessary property of optimal and beneficial ambiguous persuasion. We consider two applications, including the well-known uniform-quadratic example. Our analysis provides a justification for how ambiguity may emerge endogenously in persuasion.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Ambiguity aversion; Information transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053118306653
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Ambiguous Persuasion (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:312-365

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.008

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().