On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations

Kym Pram

Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 180, issue C, 1-10

Abstract: A target equilibrium in a game of complete information is called robust to incomplete information when all nearby games of incomplete information have equilibria that generate similar ex-ante distributions over actions to the distribution generated by the target equilibrium. Robustness to canonical elaborations considers only nearby games with a special structure. I show that robustness to incomplete information and robustness to canonical elaborations are equivalent when the equilibrium concept in the nearby incomplete information games is agent normal form correlated equilibrium.

Keywords: Game theory; Robustness; Incomplete information; Correlated equilibrium; Potential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053118306823
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:1-10

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.001

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().