Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules

Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko

Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 180, issue C, 244-273

Abstract: Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of candidates of a given size. We provide an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules in the spirit of celebrated Young's characterization of single-winner scoring rules. We show that committee scoring rules are characterized by the set of four standard axioms: symmetry, consistency, continuity and Pareto dominance. In the course of our proof, we introduce and axiomatically characterize multiwinner decision scoring rules, a class of rules that generalizes the well-known majority relation.

Keywords: Multiwinner voting; Axioms; Social choice; Axiomatic characterization; Committee scoring rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:244-273

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.011

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