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Repeated implementation: A practical characterization

Helmuts Azacis () and Péter Vida

Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 180, issue C, 336-367

Abstract: We characterize the social choice functions that are repeatedly implementable. The necessary and sufficient condition is formulated in terms of the equilibrium payoff set of an associated repeated game. It follows that the implementability of a function can be tested numerically by approximating the equilibrium payoff set. Additionally, with the help of our characterization, we demonstrate that an efficient function is implementable if and only if it satisfies a weaker version of Maskin monotonicity. As an application, we prove that utilitarian social choice functions are implementable by showing that continuation payoff promises effectively play the role of side-payments, which are needed for implementation in static setups.

Keywords: Repeated implementation; Dynamic monotonicity; Efficiency; Repeated games; Sufficient and necessary conditions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:336-367

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.002

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