Matching with single-peaked preferences

Sophie Bade

Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 180, issue C, 81-99

Abstract: The crawler is a new efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational mechanism for housing markets with single-peaked preferences. In a housing market each agent is endowed with exactly one house. These houses are ordered – by their size for example – and all agents preferences are single-peaked with respect to that order. The crawler screens agents in order of their houses' sizes, starting with the smallest. The first agent who does not want to move to a larger house is matched with his most preferred house. Agents who currently occupy houses sized between this agent's original and chosen houses “crawl” to the next largest unmatched house. This process is repeated until all agents are matched. The crawler is easier to understand than Gale's top trading cycles and can be extended to allow for indifferences.

Keywords: Matching; Single-peaked preferences; Gale's top trading cycles; Obvious strategyproofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:81-99

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.004

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