What you get is what you see: Cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan and Ehud Lehrer

Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 181, issue C, 197-237

Abstract: We consider two-player repeated games, where the players observe their own payoffs with a positive probability. Typically, a player observes neither the other's actions nor her own payoffs. We show that when costly communication is available to the players and when they are patient enough, being aware of her own payoffs suffices to provide the players with any strictly efficient payoff by sequential equilibrium.

Keywords: Discounted repeated games; Observable payoffs; Efficient payoffs; Information matrix; Sequential equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C44 C72 C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:181:y:2019:i:c:p:197-237

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.02.007

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