Asynchronous games with transfers: Uniqueness and optimality

Prajit K. Dutta and Paolo Siconolfi

Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 183, issue C, 46-75

Abstract: This paper studies asynchronous dynamic games with one period ahead transfers. There is a unique equilibrium that coincides with the Utilitarian Pareto Optimum whenever the horizon is finite. With an infinite horizon, the same result holds when action history dependence is allowed but not history dependence on transfers. The result is restored with a finite but costly memory of transfers as well as with continuous transfer strategies. Multiplicity can arise from strategies that have an infinite memory of transfers. Finally, we provide a full characterization of equilibrium payoffs when players become infinitely patient.

Keywords: Transfers; Asynchronous; Folk Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C3 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:183:y:2019:i:c:p:46-75

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.005

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