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On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information

Pavlo Prokopovych and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Journal of Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 184, issue C

Abstract: This paper develops a new approach to investigating equilibrium existence in first-price auctions with many asymmetric bidders whose types are affiliated and valuations are interdependent and not necessarily strictly increasing in own type. We begin with studying a number of continuity-related properties of the model, which are used, in conjunction with tieless single crossing and H-convexity, to establish the existence of monotone approximate interim equilibria. Then we provide two sets of sufficient conditions for the game to have a sequence of monotone approximate equilibria whose limit points are pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria.

Keywords: First-price auction; Payoff security; Monotone equilibrium; Generalized convexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:184:y:2019:i:c:s0022053118306501

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.012

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