Community enforcement using modal actions

Sam Jindani

Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 185, issue C

Abstract: Can cooperation be sustained in large populations? This paper studies settings in which a large group of players is rematched at random each period. In such settings cooperation cannot be sustained by an equilibrium unless deviators are sanctioned by third parties. This is known as the problem of community enforcement. Previous analyses have relied on strong assumptions about what information players have access to. This paper shows that when players are matched with multiple partners in each period, it is possible to limit the amount of information required to support cooperative outcomes. The results hold for general games and for equilibria that are robust to noise.

Keywords: Repeated games; Random matching; Community enforcement; Information transmission; Modal actions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:185:y:2020:i:c:s0022053118301248

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104972

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