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Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game

Parkash Chander and Myrna Wooders

Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 187, issue C

Abstract: We propose a new solution concept for games in extensive form that incorporates both cooperation and subgame perfection. From its definition and properties, the new solution concept, named the subgame-perfect core, is a refinement of the core of an extensive game in the same sense as the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria is a refinement of the set of Nash equilibria. To further characterize the subgame-perfect core, we show that each subgame-perfect core payoff vector can be implemented as a non-cooperative solution, as it is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vector of an extensive form game that is closely related to the original game. We also motivate and introduce a related concept of subgame-perfect strong Nash equilibrium of an extensive game that is coalition proof.

Keywords: Extensive game; Subgame perfection; Coalitional game; Centipede game; Bargaining game; Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Subgame Perfect Cooperation in an Extensive Game (2010) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:187:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120300223

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105017

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