Multigenerational transmission of culture

Daniel Spiro

Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 188, issue C

Abstract: This paper explores intergenerational transmission of culture and the consequences of a plausible assumption: that people care not only for their children's culture but also for how their grandchildren and later generations are raised. This departs from the previous literature which, without exception, assumes parents either do not care about, or fail to consider, the effect their actions have on all future generations. The current paper models a sequential game where parents take actions trading off being close to their own preferences and influencing their children, and where parents take into account that this affects all future generations. Predictions regarding endogenous extremism, the effect of societal socialization, parents' discounting, social pressure and interaction between groups are derived. In equilibrium, parents behave more extremely than their own preferences and this effect is intensified the more extreme preferences the parent has. There may be perpetual extremizing whereby an arbitrarily long sequence of generations will behave more extremely than the first ancestor's preferences. Furthermore, interaction of groups amplifies the extreme behavior of parents thus creating polarization, possibly without bound, but also implies faster integration.

Keywords: Culture; Integration; Polarization; Extremism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D9 J15 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Multigenerational Transmission of Culture (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120300387

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105037

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