Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information

Naomi Utgoff

Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 188, issue C

Abstract: This paper provides a unifying framework for matching markets with incomplete information in which the positive assortative match is always efficient. I construct a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-like mechanism which implements the positive assortative match as an ex post Nash equilibrium. It achieves this result by using a payment rule that distinguishes between an agent deprived of any match and an agent who merely receives a reduced match value. The constructed mechanism recognizes only opportunity costs arising from the former, and not the latter, effect. I also generalize the stronger condition of envy freeness to these incomplete information environments and show that the constructed equilibrium is envy free.

Keywords: Matching; Market design; Auctions; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120300521

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105054

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