Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies

Christoph Müller

Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 189, issue C

Abstract: We examine a strong form of robust implementation in dynamic mechanisms that is both belief- and belief-revision-free. Specifically, we characterize robust wPBE-implementation, that is, full implementation in weak Perfect Bayesian equilibrium across all type spaces. We introduce a dynamic robust monotonicity condition that is weaker than Bergemann and Morris' (2011) robust monotonicity condition and show that under a conditional no total indifference condition, ex-post incentive compatibility and dynamic robust monotonicity characterize robust wPBE-implementation in general dynamic mechanisms. We also introduce a notion of weakly rationalizable implementation (wr-implementation) and prove that it is equivalent to robust wPBE-implementation. Applied to static mechanisms, wr-implementation exactly characterizes a version of static belief-free implementation.

Keywords: Robust implementation; Dynamic mechanisms; Weak rationalizability; Weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Dynamic robust monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:189:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120300399

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105038

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