Information aggregation with runoff voting
Nikolas Tsakas and
Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 191, issue C
A majority of truth-seeking voters wants to choose the alternative that better matches the state of the world, but voters may disagree on which alternative is the best match due to private information. When we have an arbitrary number of alternatives and sophisticated partisan voters exist in the electorate, electing the correct alternative is challenging. We show that multi-round runoff voting achieves asymptotically full-information equivalence. That is, when the society is large, it can lead to the election of the correct alternative under fairly general assumptions regarding the information structure and partisans' preferences.
Keywords: Runoff voting; Information aggregation; Partisan voters; Sequential elimination; Condorcet jury theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Information Aggregation with Runoff Voting (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:191:y:2021:i:c:s002205312030123x
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