Fully Bayesian aggregation

Franz Dietrich

Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 194, issue C

Abstract: Can a group be an orthodox rational agent? This requires the group's aggregate preferences to follow expected utility (static rationality) and to evolve by Bayesian updating (dynamic rationality). Group rationality is possible, but the only preference aggregation rules which achieve it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the linear-geometric rules, which combine individual values linearly and combine individual beliefs geometrically. Linear-geometric preference aggregation contrasts with classic linear-linear preference aggregation, which combines both values and beliefs linearly, but achieves only static rationality. Our characterisation of linear-geometric preference aggregation has two corollaries: a characterisation of linear aggregation of values (Harsanyi's Theorem) and a characterisation of geometric aggregation of beliefs.

Keywords: Preference aggregation under uncertainty; Values aggregation and Harsanyi's Theorem; Belief aggregation and geometric pooling; Bayesian rational group; Static versus dynamic rationality; Spurious unanimity and Pareto conditions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Fully Bayesian Aggregation (2021)
Working Paper: Fully Bayesian Aggregation (2021)
Working Paper: Fully Bayesian Aggregation (2021)
Working Paper: Fully Bayesian Aggregation (2021)
Working Paper: Fully Bayesian Aggregation (2021)
Working Paper: Fully Bayesian Aggregation (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:194:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000727

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105255

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