Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets

Ning Sun and Zaifu Yang

Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 194, issue C

Abstract: We propose a senior level job matching model with multiple heterogeneous incumbents and entrants. An agent (firm or worker) can be committed or uncommitted (i.e., free). A committed agent is bound by her commitment and cannot unilaterally dissolve her partnership unless her partner agrees to do so. A free agent can make decisions independently. Every agent has preferences over multiple contracts and tries to find her best possible partner with a contract. We examine the problem of how to match workers and firms as well as possible and to set free as many committed agents as possible without violating any commitment. We show the existence of stable and (strict) core matchings through our designed market mechanism and obtain a lattice result for such outcomes and incentive compatibility results for the mechanism.

Keywords: Job matching; Core; Stability; Commitment; Procedure; Incentive (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D47 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:194:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000764

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105259

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