A solution to the two-person implementation problem

Jean-François Laslier, Matias Nuñez and Remzi Sanver

Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 194, issue C

Abstract: We propose strike mechanisms as a solution to the classical problem of Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978) and Maskin (1999) according to which, in two-person societies, no Pareto efficient rule is Nash-implementable. A strike mechanism specifies the number of alternatives that each player vetoes. Each player simultaneously casts these vetoes and the mechanism selects randomly one alternative among the non-vetoed ones. For strict preferences over alternatives and under a very weak condition for extending preferences over lotteries, these mechanisms are deterministic-in-equilibrium. They Nash implement a class of Pareto efficient social choice rules called Pareto-and-veto rules. Moreover, under mild richness conditions on the domain of preferences over lotteries, any Pareto efficient Nash-implementable rule is a Pareto-and-veto rule and hence is implementable through a strike mechanism.

Keywords: Nash implementation; Two players; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A solution to the two-person implementation problem (2021)
Working Paper: A solution to the two-person implementation problem (2021)
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Working Paper: A solution to the two-person implementation problem (2020)
Working Paper: A solution to the two-person implementation problem (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:194:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000788

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105261

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