Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems

René van den Brink, Marina Núñez () and Francisco Robles

Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 195, issue C

Abstract: In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity properties that are compatible with stability. We show that for a fixed population, the sellers-optimal (respectively the buyers-optimal) stable rules are the only stable rules that satisfy object-valuation antimonotonicity (respectively buyer-valuation monotonicity). Essential in these properties is that, after a change in valuations, monotonicity is required only for buyers that stay matched with the same seller. Using Owen's derived consistency, the two optimal rules are characterized among all allocation rules for two-sided assignment markets with a variable population, without explicitly requiring stability.

Keywords: Assignment problems; Stability; Valuation monotonicity; Grand valuation fairness; Optimal stable rules; Fair division rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:195:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000946

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105277

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