Games with coupled populations: An experiment in continuous time

Volker Benndorf, Ismael Martínez-Martínez and Hans-Theo Normann

Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 195, issue C

Abstract: We propose a model of coupled population games where intra- and intergroup interactions overlap. We analyze the general class of symmetric 2×2 games with coupled replicator dynamics in this framework. Standard one- and two-population predictions extend to a total of ten regions with different sets of attractors, among them novel hybrid points where one population randomizes and the other plays a pure strategy. Building on the theoretical analysis, we run continuous-time laboratory experiments using 48 different variants of coupled games. Observations confirm the theory to a large extent, but we also find a number of systematic deviations. When the attractors' eigenvalues are smaller (in absolute terms), play converges to steady states located further from the prediction.

Keywords: Equilibrium selection; Population games; Continuous-time experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 C73 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:195:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121000983

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105281

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