Economics at your fingertips  

Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices

Martin Hagen () and Angel Hernando-Veciana ()

Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 196, issue C

Abstract: A seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, (ii) ex-post individual rationality and (iii) ex-post budget balance if and only if it is a posted-price mechanism. A similar, more general result holds if (iii) is replaced by ex-post collusion-proofness and a no-free lunch condition. We provide a unified proof of both findings via the property of non-bossiness.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Bilateral trade; Multidimensional private information; Posted prices; Dominant strategies; Collusion-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105317

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2023-01-26
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:196:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121001344