Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms

Efthymios Athanasiou and Giacomo Valletta

Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 198, issue C

Abstract: We address the problem of choosing between two public alternatives under the assumption that preferences are quasi-linear. We characterize the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible mechanisms that are undominated, that exhibit a minimal degree of neutrality towards the two alternatives and that do not allow for positive monetary transfers to agents whose preferred alternative is selected. The Pivotal mechanism is the only decision-efficient member of the class. A family of voting mechanisms which do not perform monetary transfers are the only budget-balanced members of the class.

Keywords: Undominated mechanisms; Binary public decisions; Strategy-proofness; Decision efficiency; Budget-balance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:198:y:2021:i:c:s0022053121001721

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105355

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