 Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discountingAni Dasgupta and Sambuddha Ghosh Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 200, issue C Abstract: We propose a simple geometric construct called ‘self-accessibility’ to study discounted infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring. Self-accessibility delivers payoffs by computing action paths that keep all continuation payoff vectors close to the target payoff. It unifies the analysis of games with symmetric and asymmetric discounting, dispenses with public randomization, and generates pure on-path strategies. We first use it to simplify Fudenberg and Maskin (1986, 1991) and generalize their results to asymmetric discounting. Next, we use self-accessibility to find all payoff profiles that are realizable via some path at some (possibly asymmetric) discount vector. Finally, we offer an easily-verifiable sufficient and almost necessary condition for a payoff profile to arise in a subgame-perfect equilibrium, and use self-accessibility to explicitly construct the corresponding equilibrium strategies. We show that achieving cooperation via intertemporal trade among unequally patient players may require very different arrangements from those proposed earlier by Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) for two players using public randomization. Keywords: Repeated games; Public randomization; Asymmetric discounting (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:200:y:2022:i:c:s0022053121001290 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105312 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.