Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence
Marcus Pivato
Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 200, issue C
Abstract:
How should we aggregate the ex ante preferences of Bayesian agents with heterogeneous beliefs? Suppose the state of the world is described by a random process that unfolds over time. Different agents have different beliefs about the probabilistic laws governing this process. As new information is revealed over time by the process, agents update their beliefs and preferences via Bayes rule. Consider a Pareto principle that applies only to preferences which remain stable in the long run under these updates. I show that this “eventual Pareto” principle implies that the social planner must be a utilitarian. But it does not impose any relationship between the beliefs of the individuals and those of the planner, except for a weak compatibility condition.
Keywords: Subjective expected utility; Utilitarian; Ex ante Pareto; Stochastic process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:200:y:2022:i:c:s0022053121002167
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105399
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