Robust perfect equilibrium in large games

Enxian Chen, Lei Qiao, Xiang Sun and Yeneng Sun

Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 201, issue C

Abstract: This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept “robust perfect equilibrium” for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and also in pure strategies) and satisfy the important properties of admissibility, aggregate robustness, and ex post robust perfection. These properties strengthen relevant equilibrium results in an extensive literature on strategic interactions among a large number of agents. Illustrative applications to congestion games are presented. In the particular case of a congestion game with strictly increasing cost functions, we show that there is a unique symmetric robust perfect equilibrium.

Keywords: Robust perfect equilibrium; Admissibility; Aggregate robustness; Ex post robust perfection; Large games; Congestion games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C65 C72 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:201:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000230

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105433

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