Verifiable communication on networks

German Gieczewski

Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 204, issue C

Abstract: This paper models the diffusion of verifiable information on a network populated by biased agents. Some agents, who are exogenously informed, choose whether to inform their neighbors. Informing a neighbor affects her behavior, but also enables her to inform others. Agents cannot lie; they can, however, feign ignorance. The model yields three main results. First, unless a large set of agents is initially informed, learning is incomplete. Second, full learning is more likely for moderate than for extreme states of the world. Third, when agents are forward-looking, concerns about learning cascades lead to an endogenous division of the population into like-minded groups that do not communicate with each other.

Keywords: Verifiable information; Networks; Social learning; Strategic communication; Learning cascades (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:204:y:2022:i:c:s0022053122000849

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105494

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