Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains

Souvik Roy and Soumyarup Sadhukhan

Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, vol. 209, issue C

Abstract: We consider the problem of choosing a committee from a set of available candidates through a randomized social choice function when there are restrictions on the committee to be formed and agents have separable preferences over the committees. We show that when the set of feasible committees is non-vacuously restricted, that is, cannot be seen as the set of all committees with a subset of members, a random social choice function is onto and strategy-proof if and only if it is random dictatorial.

Keywords: Committee formation under constraints; Random social choice function; Strategy-proofness; Ontoness; Random dictatorial rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:209:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000443

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105648

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