Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations

Tymon Tatur

Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, vol. 212, issue C

Abstract: This paper considers an evolutionary dynamic to study games played in large populations that consist of many identical, potentially small subpopulations, where individuals interact with others in their subpopulation, rarely moving between them.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Mutation strategies; Endogenous mutations; Evolutionary stability; Finite populations; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:212:y:2023:i:c:s002205312300073x

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105677

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