A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff

Jakub Dargaj and Jakob Grue Simonsen

Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, vol. 213, issue C

Abstract: It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or for classes of games satisfying certain conditions not known to be both necessary and sufficient.

Keywords: Repeated games; Limit-of-means payoff; Computability; Best response strategies; Subgame-perfect equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 Y80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053123001096
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:213:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123001096

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105713

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().