Fomenting conflict

Martin Szydlowski

Journal of Economic Theory, 2024, vol. 220, issue C

Abstract: I study information disclosure as a means to create conflict. A sender aims to keep two parties engaged in a war of attrition and reveals information about their relative strength. In the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium, the sender employs “shifting rhetoric”: she alternates pipetting good and bad news about each party, so that neither appears too strong. Information designed to induce one party to continue fighting weakens the other party's incentives. This spillover effect may lead to early resolution and leave the sender worse off. With commitment, the sender provides delayed noisy disclosures. A partisan sender, who favors one party, instead provides information which leads to immediate resolution.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; War of attrition; Exogenous news; Shifting rhetoric; Propaganda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D74 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053124000814
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:220:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124000814

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105875

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().