Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games

Takuma Habu, Elliot Lipnowski and Doron Ravid

Journal of Economic Theory, 2024, vol. 221, issue C

Abstract: We revisit the canonical model of repeated games with two patient players, observable actions, and one-sided incomplete information, and make the substantive assumption that the informed player's preference is state independent. We show the informed player can attain a payoff in equilibrium if and only if she can attain it in the simple class of equilibria first studied by Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns (1968), in which the initial stages are used only for revealing information, and no further information is revealed after the initial stages. This sufficiency result does not extend to the uninformed player's equilibrium payoff set.

Keywords: Repeated games; Incomplete information; Transparent motives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053124000942
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:221:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124000942

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105888

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().