Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: An equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models

Sushil Bikhchandani and Debasis Mishra

Journal of Economic Theory, 2024, vol. 222, issue C

Abstract: We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. We derive three new results for the identical-objects model: (i) a new condition for revenue monotonicity of stochastic mechanisms, (ii) a sufficient condition on priors, such that prices in optimal deterministic mechanism are not increasing, and (iii) a simplification of incentive constraints for deterministic mechanisms. We use the equivalence to establish corresponding results in the heterogeneous-objects model.

Keywords: Rank-preserving mechanism; Revenue maximization; Multidimensional mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053124001297
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:222:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124001297

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().