Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk
Alp Atakan,
Mehmet Ekmekci and
Ludovic Renou
Journal of Economic Theory, 2024, vol. 222, issue C
Abstract:
We study a cheap-talk game where two experts offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that the decision-maker's ability to cross-verify the experts' advice acts as a commitment device for the experts. We prove the existence of an equilibrium, where an expert's equilibrium payoff is equal to what he would obtain if he could commit to truthfully revealing his information.
Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Information design; Commitment; Cheap talk; Multiple experts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053124001406
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:222:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124001406
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105934
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell
More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().