 Social learning through coarse signals of others' actionsWenji Xu Journal of Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 229, issue C Abstract: This paper studies a sequential social learning model in which agents learn about an underlying state from others' actions. Unlike classic models, we consider a setting where agents may observe coarse signals of past actions. We identify a simple, necessary, and sufficient condition for asymptotic learning, called separability, which depends on both the information environment and the payoff structure. A necessary condition for separability is “unbounded beliefs” which requires agents' private information to generate strong evidence of the true state, even if only with small probabilities. We also identify conditions on the information environment alone that guarantee separability for all payoff structures. These conditions include unbounded beliefs and a new condition on agents' signals of others' actions, termed double thresholds. Without double thresholds, learning can be confounded so that agents always choose different actions with positive probabilities and never reach a consensus. Keywords: Social learning; Coarse signal; Asymptotic learning; Separability; Confounded learning; Double thresholds (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:229:y:2025:i:c:s0022053125001127 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106066 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier |
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