Implementing a public project and distributing its cost

Matthew Jackson and Herve Moulin

Journal of Economic Theory, 1992, vol. 57, issue 1, 125-140

Abstract: We provide a game form which undertakes a public project exactly when the total benefit of the project to individuals in a society outweights its cost. The game form is simple, balanced, and individually rational. It can be adjusted to distribute cost according to a wide class of rules. For example it can distribute cost so that each individual pays a share of the cost which is proportional to his or her benefit. We discuss the informational limitations of our work and the relation of this work to the literature on mechanism design and public goods.

Date: 1992
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Working Paper: Implementing A Public Project and Distributing Its Costs (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:57:y:1992:i:1:p:125-140

DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(05)80044-4

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