A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers
Motty Perry () and
Philip Reny ()
Journal of Economic Theory, 1993, vol. 59, issue 1, 50-77
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:59:y:1993:i:1:p:50-77
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