Rivalrous Benefit Taxation: The Independent Viability of Separate Agencies or Firms

Aaron Edlin () and Epelbaum Mario

Journal of Economic Theory, 1995, vol. 66, issue 1, 33-63

Date: 1995
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Working Paper: Rivalrous Benefit Taxation: The Independent Viability of Separate Agencies or Firms (1993)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:66:y:1995:i:1:p:33-63

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