Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model

Cheng Wang

Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, vol. 76, issue 1, 72-105

Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(97)92293-6
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model (1997)
Working Paper: Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:76:y:1997:i:1:p:72-105

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Theory is currently edited by A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

More articles in Journal of Economic Theory from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().