Do small shareholders count?
Eugene Kandel (),
Massimo Massa and
Journal of Financial Economics, 2011, vol. 101, issue 3, 641-665
We hypothesize that age similarity among small shareholders acts as an implicit coordinating device for their actions and, thus, could represent an indirect source of corporate governance in firms with dispersed ownership. We test this hypothesis on a sample of Swedish firms during the 1995-2000 period. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that compared with shareholders of differing ages, same-age noncontrolling shareholders sell more aggressively following negative firm news; firms with more age-similar small shareholders are more profitable and command higher valuation; and an increase (decline) in a firm's small shareholder age similarity brings a significantly large increase (decline) in its stock price. The last effects are more pronounced in the absence of a controlling shareholder.
Keywords: Shareholder; heterogeneity; Firm; value; Corporate; finance; Managerial; decision; making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:101:y:2011:i:3:p:641-665
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Financial Economics is currently edited by G. William Schwert
More articles in Journal of Financial Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nithya Sathishkumar ().