The role of investment banker directors in M&A

Qianqian Huang, Feng Jiang, Erik Lie and Ke Yang

Journal of Financial Economics, 2014, vol. 112, issue 2, 269-286

Abstract: We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect firms׳ acquisition behavior. We find that firms with investment bankers on the board have a higher probability of making acquisitions. Furthermore, acquirers with investment banker directors experience higher announcement returns, pay lower takeover premiums and advisory fees, and exhibit superior long-run performance. Overall, our results suggest that directors with investment banking experience help firms make better acquisitions, both by identifying suitable targets and by reducing the cost of the deals.

Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions; Board of directors; Investment banking experience (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G24 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (69)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:112:y:2014:i:2:p:269-286

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.02.003

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