Tailspotting: Identifying and profiting from CEO vacation trips

David Yermack

Journal of Financial Economics, 2014, vol. 113, issue 2, 252-269

Abstract: This paper shows connections between chief executive officers׳ (CEOs׳) absences from headquarters and corporate news disclosures. I identify CEO absences by merging records of corporate jet flights and CEOs׳ property ownership near leisure destinations. CEOs travel to their vacation homes just after companies report favorable news, and CEOs return to headquarters right before subsequent news releases. When CEOs are away, companies announce less news, mandatory disclosures occur later, and stock volatility falls sharply. Volatility increases when CEOs return to work. CEOs spend fewer days out of the office when ownership is high and when weather is bad at their vacation homes.

Keywords: Disclosure; Corporate jets; CEO vacations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:113:y:2014:i:2:p:252-269

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.04.008

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