China׳s secondary privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform

Li Liao, Bibo Liu and Hao Wang

Journal of Financial Economics, 2014, vol. 113, issue 3, 500-518

Abstract: The Split-Share Structure Reform granted legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), opening up the gate to China׳s secondary privatization. The expectation of privatization quickly boosted SOE output, profits, and employment, but did not change their operating efficiency and corporate governance. The improvements to SOE performance are positively correlated to government agents’ privatization-led incentive of increasing state-owned share value. In terms of privatization methodology, the reform adopted a market mechanism that played an effective information discovery role in aligning the interests of the government and public investors.

Keywords: The Split-Share Structure Reform; Privatization; State-owned enterprise; Financial reform; Market mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G18 G28 G30 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (114)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:113:y:2014:i:3:p:500-518

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.05.007

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