CEO optimism and incentive compensation

Clemens A. Otto

Journal of Financial Economics, 2014, vol. 114, issue 2, 366-404

Abstract: I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts.

Keywords: CEO optimism; Incentive compensation; Compensation contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (57)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:114:y:2014:i:2:p:366-404

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.06.006

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