Contractual incompleteness, limited liability and asset price bubbles

James Dow and Jungsuk Han

Journal of Financial Economics, 2015, vol. 116, issue 2, 383-409

Abstract: When should we expect bubbles? Can levered intermediaries bid up risky asset prices through asset substitution? We study an economy with financial intermediaries that issue debt and equity to buy risky assets. Asset substitution alone cannot cause bubbles because it is priced into the intermediaries׳ securities. But incomplete contracts and managerial agency problems can make intermediaries take excessive risk to exploit limited liability, bidding up risky asset prices. This destroys welfare through misallocation of resources. We argue that incentives for private monitoring cannot solve this problem. Finally, even without agency problems, debt subsidies will create similar effects.

Keywords: Leverage; Limited liability; Bubbles; Contractual incompleteness; Asset substitution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D53 G12 G21 G23 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:116:y:2015:i:2:p:383-409

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.02.002

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