Do staggered boards harm shareholders?
Yakov Amihud () and
Journal of Financial Economics, 2017, vol. 123, issue 2, 432-439
We examine the Cohen and Wang (2013) conclusion that a staggered board lowers firm value based on the stock price reaction to two 2010 Delaware court rulings in the Airgas, Inc. case. The first ruling weakened the potency of a staggered board and the second restored it. We find that the Cohen and Wang results, for their sample, become insignificant after excluding a few penny stocks, stocks with value below $10 million, or over-the-counter (non-exchange) stocks. The effects of the rulings are also insignificant for an alternative sample.
Keywords: Staggered board; Classified board; Corporate governance; Antitakeover measures; Takeover defense; Airgas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:123:y:2017:i:2:p:432-439
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