Reexamining staggered boards and shareholder value

Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang

Journal of Financial Economics, 2017, vol. 125, issue 3, 637-647

Abstract: Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not statistically significant. We show that the results retain their significance under a wide array of robustness tests that address the concerns expressed by AS2016. Our empirical findings reinforce the conclusions of CW2013.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Staggered boards; Takeover defense; Antitakeover provisions; Firm value; Delaware; Airgas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:125:y:2017:i:3:p:637-647

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.004

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