Staggered boards and long-term firm value, revisited

K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov and Simone M. Sepe

Journal of Financial Economics, 2017, vol. 126, issue 2, 422-444

Abstract: This paper revisits the staggered board debate focusing on the long-term association of firm value with changes in board structure. We find no evidence that staggered board changes are negatively related to firm value. However, we find a positive relation for firms engaged in innovation and where stakeholder relationships matter more. This suggests that staggered boards promote value creation for some firms by committing the firm to undertaking long-term projects and bonding it to the relationship-specific investments of its stakeholders. Our results are robust to matching procedures and an exogenous change in Massachusetts corporate law that mandated staggered boards.

Keywords: Staggered board; Firm value; Stakeholder relationships; Innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X17302143
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:126:y:2017:i:2:p:422-444

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.08.003

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Financial Economics is currently edited by G. William Schwert

More articles in Journal of Financial Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().