Bid anticipation, information revelation, and merger gains
Journal of Financial Economics, 2018, vol. 128, issue 2, 320-343
Because firms’ takeover motives are unobservable to investors, mergers are only partially anticipated and often appear as mixed blessings for acquirers. I construct and estimate a model to study the causes and consequences of bid anticipation and information revelation in mergers. Controlling for the market’s reassessment of the acquirer’s stand-alone value, I estimate that acquirers gain 4% from a typical merger. The total value of an active merger market averages 13% for acquirers, part of which is capitalized in their pre-merger market values. My model also explains the correlation between announcement returns and firm characteristics, as well as the low predictability of mergers.
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions; Revelation; Anticipation; Merger gains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:128:y:2018:i:2:p:320-343
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